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1.

Introduction
This paper is about the fundamental drivers of urban growth: in particular in a European institutional and geographic context. There is a powerful and rigorous US tradition analysing regional or urban growth in a neo-classical framework assuming full spatial equilibrium. A good exemplar is Glaeser et al (1995) . They build on the compensating differentials model of Roback (1982) . Full spatial equilibrium implies that people cannot improve their welfare by moving from one location to another whether that is between neighbourhoods in one city or from one city to another. Differences in prices, for quality constant houses, or wages, for productivity constant workers, signal differences in the value of environmental amenities across space. People equalise real welfare, not even just real wages, across space, so they accept higher house prices and/or lower wages to live and/or work in more desirable locations. So Glaeser et al (1995) conclude that since people vote with their feet, the best measure of changing patterns of spatial welfare is differential rates of population growth as a result of net migration: not differential rates of productivity growth, manifesting itself in different rates of output or GDP per capita growth.
Empirically the most important of these environmental factors leading to quality of life differences between regions seems to be climate (see Graves, 1976; 1980 and 1983; or 2003a & b; Rappaport, 2007) but there is a more elaborate literature analysing spatial differences in the 'quality of life' building on full spatial equilibrium as an underlying assumption. Gyourko and Tracy (1991) , for example, include in their estimates the implied value of differences in local public goods. Several recent articles by Glaeser and associates (for example Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2006) implicitly use the assumption of full spatial equilibrium as support for an analysis of the causes of 'urban resurgence' and the rediscovery of the 'consumer city'. They observe real wages have been falling in cities relative to non-urban areas because urban productivity and wages have not risen as fast as urban house prices. Since city population(s) have been stabilising, however, they conclude that urban resurgence is more because of the rising attractiveness of cities as places to live (significantly because of falling urban crime rates) than because of increasing agglomeration economies driving factor productivity growth in cities compared to non-urban areas.
Europe is a continent of nation states with only recent and partial steps towards integration. It is, moreover, a continent of geographically very sticky people. The reasons for Europeans' low responsiveness to differences in opportunities across space seem complex. The costs of movement are high compared to the US, because of transactions costs and housing policies (social housing is a much larger fraction of the stock in most EU countries and place-specific and rent controlled housing ties people to their existing locations). Probably more important, however, are differences in culture, . 3 language and institutions. For whatever reason, in an earlier paper (Cheshire and Magrini, 2006) we showed that while population movement across the EU of 12 between 1980 and 2000 did significantly respond to generalised differences in economic advantage (as reflected, for example, in the systematic spatial effects of European integration or regional inheritances of old resource-based industries), and also responded to climatic differences, the evidence was inconsistent with full spatial equilibrium. The response of population movement to economic factors was sluggish; net migration rates between comparably sized regions in the USA are fifteen times greater than in Europe (Cheshire and Magrini, 2006) . Perhaps more telling, population movement responded strongly to climatic differences but only to climatic differences within countries. There was no significant migration response to climatic differences measured across Europe as a whole. Moreover population growth interactions between regions were strongly impeded by national borders.
This finding provides additional interest to trying to understand better the drivers of urban economic growth -the main focus of this paper. It implies that Europe is not typified by full spatial equilibrium and even if migration flows did reduce spatial disparities, real differences in welfare between regions may be strongly persistent. Differences in levels of real per capita GDP or in its growth, are unlikely to be fully offset by counterbalancing differences in environmental quality or amenities. This investigation of the drivers of economic growth differences across the city-regions of the EU has implications for wider themes, therefore. It carries strong implications for whether it is reasonable to think of a single European 'urban system'; it sheds light on the mechanisms producing spatial economic adjustment and how national borders still impede this while dense urbanisation and good transport links facilitate it; it reveals an important limitation of the Tiebout hypothesis 1 ; and it implies that concern for spatial disparities in GDP per capita or growth, may be reasonable in Europe, if policy aims to reduce spatial welfare differences for similar individuals.
In addressing questions of differential spatial growth the question immediately arises: what are the most appropriate spatial units to look at? US urban scholars automatically use data for core-based metropolitan regions (or CBSAs) 2 . These were originally known as Standard Metropolitan Areas (SMAs) but precise criteria for defining them and the names applied have evolved over time. US textbooks such as Mills and Hamilton (1994) or DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996) hardly discuss the 1 Tiebout (1956) is one of the most highly cited papers in local public finance and in applied urban economics. This analyses a world in which people can vote with their feet for the package of local public goods and services which best suits their incomes and preferences and shows that under the assumption of full spatial equilibrium and no local public policy spillovers competition between local jurisdictions can produce optimal sets of local public goods. The issue here is that in the context of European systems of local government we need to consider a world in which people are not perfectly mobile and there may be important classes of local public goods which have spatial spillovers associated with their consumption and/or their production.
reasons for using data for this standard urban concept or even alternative definitions of urban areas, except to mention the existence of administrative 'cities'. A good review of US and European concepts and definitions of urban areas and how US definitions have evolved over time is provided in Freeman (2005) .
Data for core-based city-regions have a number of critical advantages: criteria used to define them are uniform across the whole US, so while political boundaries compared to actual settlement patterns are highly variable, the data for CBSAs relate to comparable concepts of 'city'; because CBSAs include both employment and the residents who hold the jobs, they are in economic terms as self-contained as spatial subdivisions of national economies are likely to be; they cover the whole urban area, so they abstract from patterns of residential segregation -they include all citizens, both rich and poor, and all ethnic groups. The data for these US core-based city-regions are also available as time series -for population going back to 1790 -for both constant definitional boundaries and boundaries which evolve as settlements evolved and commuting systems expanded. Duranton and Puga, 2005) . There is a large enough number of consistently defined city-regions in the US for statistical analysis and the data are comparable and freely available.
The analysis in this paper employs data for a specific definition of core-based city regions -Functional Urban Regions (FURs -see section 2) -in the EU of 12. More detail is given in Section 3 but the FUR dataset was first constructed as the foundation for a research project funded by the European Commission during the 1980s (and that drew on earlier work by Hall and Hay, 1980) . The results of this, together with details of how the FURs were defined and some of the data, were set out in Cheshire and Hay, 1989 . This FUR dataset has been continuously updated and expanded and the analysis reported here uses the most recent version. In Appendix 2 we provide an illustrative map of these FURs and more detailed maps for two countries showing how their boundaries relate to those of the official 5 administrative regions.
Issues and approach
In a world characterised by full spatial equilibrium and a constant distribution of environmental amenities the drivers of spatial population growth would be the direct complement of the drivers of economic growth. Both processes are worth investigating but understanding one illuminates the other. The finding reported in Cheshire and Magrini (2006) that full spatial equilibrium is not a reasonable assumption in the context of European spatial development therefore focuses additional interest in understanding better what factors drive urban economic growth differentials -the subject of this paper.
The 'new economic geography', initiated by Krugman (1991) , has re-awakened interest amongst mainstream economists in agglomeration economies; as a result, interest in cities and their contribution to economic productivity has risen up the agenda. At the same time, internationalisation of the world's economy and European integration have created an interest in and focused more policy efforts on, local economic development. Against this background we hope this paper makes a particular contribution: to understanding the fundamental drivers of urban growth and the welfare impacts differences in growth may generate; how such growth should be measured and the implications of alternative measures; and how these forces play out in the particular European context of geographically sticky people, continuing national barriers to adjustment but dense urbanisation. At the same time we apply the tools of spatial econometrics to help understand and interpret spatial economic processes rather than as simply diagnostic tools or providers of technical fixes.
In developing and testing propositions about the sources of urban growth we draw as clearly as possible on underlying theory. One contribution of this paper is to test -indirectly -whether local growth policies have any positive impact on growth. We do this, however starting from a theoretical proposition in local public finance and treating the production of additional local growth as if it were the production of a local public good. When we explore the empirical results for evidence and sources of spatial dependence we attempt to provide an economic interpretation for those results, and draw implications for the extent of spatial disequilibrium in Western Europe and the claim that Europe is a 'network of cities' (Kresl, 2007 page 1).
Our conclusion is that city-regions in the EU behave like city-states, but city-states confined by national boundaries. Their trajectories are influenced by conditions in their neighbours within their own countries but they do not behave as simply the spatial units from which an integrated continental economy is constructed. This implies that differences in GDP per capita across EU cities not only reflect differences in productivity but also differences in welfare.
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In this paper while we are using cross sectional growth models, we are not taking the convergence approach of the numerous studies following Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) . For recent surveys of the β-convergence literature see, for example, Durlauf and Quah (1999), Temple (1999) or Magrini (2004) . We reject the β-convergence approach as uninformative and perhaps misleading for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Theoretical reasons are discussed in Cheshire and Malecki (2004) . The analysis done for this paper reinforces the empirical objections to the approach.
The β-convergence approach includes the initial level of GDP p.c. as an independent variable (with a range of additional control variables to account for differences in steady states and idiosyncratic 'shocks') and tests whether poorer nations/regions at the start of the given period grow faster on average than those that were richer. To the extent that they do, this provides a measure of their rate of convergence. Where the observational units are subdivisions of national territories, such as regions, then the standard approach is to include national dummies to control for all country-specific omitted variables. On theoretical grounds our preference is not to use national dummies to control for countryspecific effects (such as the temporal incidence of the economic cycle, institutional or policy differences) systematically affecting FUR growth, but to include the rate of growth of the national territories outside the areas of the major FURs. That major FURs do not exhaust national territories is thus turned to advantage, since it allows the estimation of a continuous variable ('non-FUR growth') to account for national specific factors in urban growth differentials. This is consistent with the underlying assumption in cross-sectional regression models that the observational units are representative of a homogeneous statistical population. It also has the practical advantage of avoiding having to pool FURs for those countries with only one or a very small number of major cities (such as Ireland, Denmark, Greece or Portugal).
What emerges is that our preferred variable not only statistically dominates national dummies but, once included, renders the initial level of FUR GDP p.c. non-significant and the parameter estimate unstable.
If both the initial level of FUR GDP p.c. and non-FUR growth are included as additional independent variables of interest, in some models apparently (non-significant) convergence emerges; in others nonsignificant divergence emerges. Clearly including both the initial level of FUR GDP p.c. and the non-FUR growth variables introduces collinearity. The remedy for problems of collinearity, if additional observations are not available, is to exclude the least satisfactory variable associated with the problem.
Since we have both theoretical and empirical reasons for excluding it, therefore, we exclude the initial level of FUR GDP p.c. This is consistent with our aim which is to understand more fully drivers of urban growth differentials rather than to investigate β-convergence which we consider theoretically 7 unsatisfactory anyway. Our underlying view is that regional growth differences are multivariate: the impact of some drivers is towards convergence (e.g. factor mobility in sectors without economies of scale) while the impact of others is towards divergence (e.g. those involving agglomeration or economies of scale) and which of the convergence/divergence effects dominates in any particular time period is an empirical issue.
We are interested in testing theoretically derived ideas about urban growth. For this we have three groups of variables; two of these were tested in an earlier paper (Cheshire and Magrini, 2000) but now more rigorously. The first group relates to the systematic spatial effects of European integration on urban growth. Concern about these goes back at least to Clark et al. (1969) and it is interesting to use as an independent variable the quantitative measures actually predicted by Clark before the impact of European integration was significantly felt. Theoretical developments of New Economic Geography (summarised in Fujita et al. 1999) have given a significant boost to interest in this potential source of differential urban growth. In addition to the variable measuring Clark et al's (1969) change in regional economic potential, associated with EU integration, we now introduce a 'peripherality' dummy, exploiting the insights gained testing for spatial dependence.
The second group of variables we are interested in attempts to capture the role of R&D and highly skilled human capital in urban growth processes. It is admittedly a crude test but does show whether the evidence is or is not consistent with a spatialised adaptation of endogenous growth theory (see, for example, Cheshire, 1995 or Magrini, 1998 . In the revised data set used here we have new measures which prove slightly more significant and illuminating than results reported previously.
The third area is entirely new; this is the relationship between systems of local and regional government and city growth performance. This relates to the wider issue of the provision of local public goods when there is also the possibility of what might be called an 'anti-Tiebout' world (Tiebout, 1956 ) with jurisdictional public good spillovers and geographically immobile people. In such circumstances, optimality may depend also on how jurisdictions are bounded. Local economic growth policies aim to increase the rate of economic growth of the territory/jurisdiction to which they are applied. If we suspend our disbelief and assume such policies might influence growth rates -abstracting for the moment from what form such policies might take -then it is clear that local policy makers would be producing a local quasi-public good. So, the relevant issue is what factors favour the formation of more effective growth promotion 'clubs'? The hypothesis advanced in Cheshire and Gordon (1996) was that such 'clubs' would be more likely to develop and be more strategically effective if the administrative boundaries of the jurisdiction more closely corresponded to those of the functional economic region.
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The logic underlying this was that the more closely these boundaries coincided, the smaller would be spillover losses of growth gains to agents in surrounding jurisdictions and the lower would be the transactions costs of forming a 'growth promotion club' because there would be fewer public sector agencies involved and a more obvious and powerful leading agency.
Since our FURs are designed to maximise self-containment 3 , they correspond to 'functional economic regions' and we are able, in effect, to test one of the basic propositions of fiscal federalism: that 'the existence and magnitude of spillover effects clearly depends on the geographical extent of the relevant jurisdiction' (Oates, 1999 (Oates, , page 1130 Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that there are important spatial adjustment mechanisms and other spatially determined features of urban and regional economies. For example, labour markets and housing markets adjust to price and real wage differences in ways conditioned on measures of 3 As noted they are defined so as to include significant geographical concentrations of jobs and all residents who commute to that employment centre. Thus in the short term all residents within a given FUR will benefit from employment or income growth within it; and the boundaries of the FUR will include the great majority of potential beneficiaries from growth. This is a 'short term' view and excludes induced migration in response to changing employment prospects or wages and also excludes trade and capital flows. Arguably growth promotion agencies are motivated by short run factors ('a week is a long time in politics'); certainly results in the conceptual short run are likely to be extremely influential. But since no data are available for sub national trade or capital flows, from a practical point of view it is reasonable to argue that FURs are the closest spatial units to self-contained economic regions one can construct a data set for and are the most economically self-contained subdivisions of national territories which exist.
accessibility. Both migration and commuting patterns are known to respond to spatial differences in economic opportunities -whether of incomes or house prices -but the impact of a given differential in economic opportunities declines as accessibility falls. Theoretical and empirical investigations of agglomeration economies, human capital and innovation suggest there are important spatial aspects of these, too. These are all possible sources of spatial interaction between cities' economies and, if omitted, they should plausibly cause spatial dependence.
Our results provide strong supporting evidence for this view. Models without variables reflecting spatial adjustment processes display significant problems of spatial dependence. However, when we include appropriate variables, discounted by distance between cities, these are statistically significant and indications of spatial dependence are eliminated.
In addition, the sensitivity of our models to measures of spatial dependence varies with the particular distance weights used. We interpret this, too, as providing insight into economic processes. We systematically experiment with distance weights including 'distance' penalties for national borders.
These experiments confirm that problems of spatial dependence only reveal themselves if an additional distance penalty to adjustment between neighbouring FURs is included for national borders, and that this seems to be optimised, in some sense, if the penalty is set at 600 minutes. This, we judge, reinforces our earlier conclusion that urban systems in Western Europe still mainly adjust as a set of national urban systems rather than as a unified EU urban system. European economic space is not a single integrated network of cities.
The data and methods
The basic method for defining the Functional Urban Regions analysed in this paper was to identify spatial units where there were at least 20 000 jobs and add to these all contiguous spatial units with a job density exceeding 12.35 jobs per hectare. These then define the 'city-cores' and for each of these, hinterlands were defined from which more commuters flowed to the core than to any other, subject to a minimum cut off level of commuting. They were defined on 1971 employment and commuting data One of the variables most subject to distortion using NUTS boundaries is GDP p.c. because GDP is estimated at workplaces while people are counted where they live. Because people commute to work across administrative boundaries, this means GDP p.c. is systematically overestimated for regions where the administrative boundaries exclude significant dormitory areas. In reality, this happens for a large number of bigger European cities (Madrid and Paris are two exceptions if we take the Level 1 regions which contain them), so official figures tend to systematically overstate GDP p.c. for large cities. At last, this distortion of GDP p.c. data has been recognised by Eurostat (Eurostat, 2005 period -1978-80 to 1992-94 -too short to correspond to a conceptual long run. This further reinforces our belief that we need to model a system in which real incomes can permanently (in the sense of any period we can observe) vary between cities.
All data are defined to common statistical concepts either weighting Eurostat data to estimate values for FURs (as with GDP p.c.) or collecting data directly from national statistical offices or common data providers and adjusting where necessary to common definitions. There is necessarily imprecision where we use estimated data but they have the merit of relating to functionally defined, economically selfcontained city-regions. The FURs, all being large metropolitan regions, are also substantially more homogenous than either NUTS regions or countries. This is econometrically helpful and since they do not exhaust national territories we can calculate the rate of GDP p.c. growth in the area of each country outside its major city-regions; as discussed above, this variable is 'non-FUR growth'. This is a continuous variable and is a more elegant and useful control than national dummies for national specific drivers of urban growth differentials. It is also consistent with our implicit claim that our observationsall the large city-regions of the EU of 12 -represent, in a statistical sense, a homogeneous population.
The analysis employs OLS but we test the results exhaustively for econometric problems. Since the observations represent the population of West European city-regions, the force of the standard objections to the use of cross sectional OLS for inference seem to be substantially mitigated. Compared to cross country 'growth regressions', our observations represent a relatively homogeneous population and data are more comparable. Our choice of spatial units should reduce or eliminate systematic spatial error in the data, or 'nuisance' spatial dependence as Anselin and Rey called it (Anselin and Rey, 1991) , and we make a strong effort to formulate variables to reflect causal mechanisms and minimise problems of endogeneity. As with all applied econometrics, however, in the end the credibility of the results is not a categorical issue but depends on judgement. We are convinced multicollinearity is not a significant problem and judge that this is also true with respect to endogeneity. But proving endogeneity is neither present nor seriously distorting results is ultimately proving a negative and that is difficult. We necessarily make compromises but believe that the departure from the ideal conditions is not so great that the results are spurious for purposes of inference.
Results
The base model
As discussed above, our approach to testing the hypotheses relating to the role of European integration, human capital and R&D and arrangements for local government builds on previous work (Cheshire and Magrini, 2000) . As the first step in our more elaborate strategy to investigate growth drivers we first find 13 a 'base model' (see Table 2 ) and test the resulting model for a range of econometric problems, including spatial dependence. Such tests show that while traditional standards for normality, functional form and heterskedasticity are satisfied, if the spatial weights matrix is formulated in an economically meaningful way (with an added time-distance penalty for national frontiers) there are indicated problems of spatial dependence which can be eliminated, without affecting the significance of other variables, by including a spatial lag of the dependent variable. In a conventional spatial econometrics framework such a result might have been considered satisfactory but we interpret the indications of spatial dependence as implying that variables related to systematic spatial patterns of growth have been omitted.
Since the aim is to understand the drivers of differential patterns of spatial growth better we include the variables designed to test the three hypotheses (Table 3 ) in the base model. Again exhaustive experimentation with the spatial weights matrix suggests there are some problems of spatial dependence (Table 4) . Instead of simply re-estimating with a spatial lagged model and stopping the investigation at this point, however, we include variables to reflect known information on drivers of differential spatial patterns of growth in the EU and on plausible spatial adjustment processes. Such variables are statistically significant when included and eliminate all problems of spatial dependence without changing other estimates.
This section explains the structure of the models and the reasons for variable inclusion. We try to make it self-contained but not too repetitive of previous published work. We concentrate on the results for the new variables and the impact of spatial dependence. In all models, the dependent variable was the annualised rate of growth of FUR GDP p.c. at PPS from the mean of 1978//80 to 1992/4. The 'base model' includes a set of control variables and the non-FUR growth variable discussed above. As in previous work the controls for industrial structure relate to measures of old resource-based industriesagriculture, coal mining and ports. These not only work better in statistical terms than broader measures of specialisation in manufacturing industry but, make better sense in economic terms and minimise problems of endogeneity. Past dependence on the coal industry is measured by the geological presence of coal measures, so should avoid any hint of endogeneity, and specialisation in agriculture and the port industry are both measured well before the start of the period to which the dependent variable relates.
Other controls are designed to reflect underlying (urban) economic theory and evidence. 
Testing Hypotheses
We then include independent variables designed to test our hypotheses. The theoretical reasons for expecting a concentration of R&D activity and highly skilled human capital to have a positive impact on local economic growth follow the analysis of Romer (1990) adapted to a spatial context (see Magrini, 1998 ). An extensive literature on the role of human capital in economic growth and the tendency for innovation to be localised with respect to R&D has developed over the past ten years, so little justification seems necessary. They are reflected here by two variables. One used in previous work is the concentration of the R&D facilities of large companies relative to population in each FUR. For some recent evidence on the spatial diffusion of innovation see Barrios et al, 2007 . The second is a new variable, university students per employee. Both these variables are measured for the start of the period to minimise problems of endogeneity.
Our next hypothesis is that there is a relationship between systems of city government and city growth performance: specifically that the more closely the administrative and functional boundaries of a cityregion correspond, the more likely it will be that effective local growth promotion policies develop. We conceive of 'growth promotion policies' in a much broader sense than as policies just designed to attract mobile investment. We would count as growth promotion policies: efficient public administration, reducing uncertainty and making decisions transparently and quickly; providing relevant infrastructure; more effective co-ordination between public and private investment; providing relevant and effective training; and ensuring that land use policies are flexible and co-ordinated with infrastructure provision and the demands of private sector investors. They could also involve giving a higher priority to output and productivity growth compared to equity or environmental outcomes.
More effective local growth promotion policies may not involve spending more, even on infrastructure, so a simple measure of local public expenditure is unlikely to capture the efficacy of growth promotion efforts even were such a variable available. Grand projects such as Bilbao's Guggenheim museum, London's Millennium Dome or a trophy metro system in Toulouse, are expensive but not necessarily productive; efficient public administration and rapid public decision-making, clearly defined land use policies and infrastructure planning, may cost less than their inefficient alternatives.
Any 'output' of such policies -extra growth -is a local quasi-public good. It will be hard to exclude non-contributing agents from any benefits policies generate: if policies paid for and implemented by the central city of a FUR increase output growth in its territory, it will be impossible to exclude commuters from surrounding jurisdictions from sharing the benefits, even though they pay no taxes within the central city. There will also be a zero opportunity cost in 'consumption' of any dividends the policy yields: if your rents rise, so do mine and that is not a cost to me; if your employment opportunities improve that, too, is not a cost to mine. There is thus a classic problem of market failure so local growth promotion polices will be likely to be produced by government or some 'club' of actors, usually local and regional governments and private sector agencies in a public-private partnership. Such clubs face varying problems of spillover losses and transaction costs. A proportion of the growth gains will leak out to agencies or residents of surrounding jurisdictions who are not members of the 'growth promotion club'. The relative size of such 'leaks' will vary with the size of the area the 'club' represents relative to that of the whole FUR (which, as discussed, maximises the proportion of the benefits retained). The closer the coincidence in the boundaries of the governmental unit within which such policies are pursued with those of the economic region/FUR within which their impact is largely contained, the proportionately less will be these spillovers. In addition, the larger is the central unit of government relative to the size of the self-contained FUR, the lower are likely to be the transactions costs in building a 'growth promotion' club 8 .
Any FUR is composed of one or more jurisdictions so a 'club' of jurisdictions (also usually including private sector actors) will have to be formed to implement growth promotion policies: in essence that is what regional development agencies are. If a 'club' forms it is reasonable to assume that the largest jurisdiction within the FUR will always be a member. In our data set the largest jurisdiction in all FURs represents the historically oldest and central jurisdiction of the core or, in some cases, the whole core city. The larger this is relative to the other jurisdictions within the FUR, the more dominant it is likely to be and the more clout it will have; so the larger is the central jurisdiction relative to the FUR as a whole, the lower are transactions costs likely to be. Whether an effective growth promotion club is formed for a city-region is not, therefore, inevitable but will be conditioned primarily on the structure of the incentives faced by these governmental and other economic actors who might form a 'growth promotion club'.
Even if expenditures are very imperfectly related to outcomes, growth promotion policies cost resources and there will be transactions costs in forming and maintaining an effective club. The expected growth gains any club might achieve will vary with local circumstances and existing policies. The club's expected gross payoff will be a direct function of the additional growth that a given club expects it can generate. Since a FUR's boundaries contain the maximum proportion of such benefits as might be generated by local growth promotion policies, for a given potential gross growth gain, the expected payoff for any growth club will fall as the size of its jurisdiction/territory falls in relation to that of the relevant FUR because the spillover losses to areas of the FUR not represented in the club increase.
Equally, assuming other factors are constant, the expected net payoff would fall as the transactions costs incurred to form the club increase. Transactions costs will be positively related to the number of relevant potential members and the institutional dominance of the lead actor (which we can assume will be a governmental unit). Thus other things equal, expected net benefits will increase and transactions costs fall as the size of the largest effective governmental unit increases relative to the size of the FUR.
Arguments such as these led Cheshire and Gordon (1996, page 389) to conclude that growth promotion policies would be more likely to appear and be more energetically pursued where 'there are a smaller 8 This may be somewhat simplified. There may be political or cultural links between some cities which are strong enough to lend some sense of joint enterprise to development efforts. Glaswegians may be happier with the thought of residents of Edinburgh sharing in their growth gains than might be the case, for example, between the citizens of Brussels and Antwerp. But even to the extent that this is true it might be regarded simply as statistically random noise and so not bias our proposed measure.
number of public agencies representing the functional economic region, with the boundaries of the highest tier authority approximating to those of the region…'.
We can specify a variable closely reflecting this feature of FURs: the ratio of the total population of the largest (relevant) jurisdiction representing the FUR to the population of the FUR as a whole. This will normally be the jurisdiction with the largest population, representing the central administrative unit of the FUR, but this is qualified by 'relevant': the jurisdiction must have significant powers of action.
Given the abolition of the Greater London Council in mid-period, the largest NUTS region with a territory overlapping that of the London FUR during the period of our analysis was the South East Region. But this was not a 'relevant' jurisdiction because it had essentially no powers 9 . The rules by which such 'relevant' local government units were identified were established before any models were estimated so that the variable could be defined blind of the data. These rules are set out in Appendix 1 and necessarily varied from country to country since the powers and structure of local governments vary widely across the EU.
We call this the 'policy incentive' variable because it is designed to measure the incentive to implement policies promoting growth at the FUR level. Since one criterion used to select the 'relevant' governmental unit for each FUR was that it should have significant administrative and decision making powers, the Level 1 regions were potentially available for selection in countries with a regional level of government. In practice, this meant that the value of the variable could range from only about 0.125 (in France) to over 2 (in Spain). We might further hypothesise that if the value of the variable were very high, so that the size of the 'relevant' unit of government substantially exceeded the size of the FUR, then the incentive to generate growth promoting policies for the FUR might weaken. The interests of the FUR would begin to be lost in those of the larger unit which might favour rural areas or smaller centres.
As an illustration one might contrast Madrid, where the boundaries of the powerful regional government are only a little larger than those of the FUR with Aviles/Gijon in Asturias. There the region is very much bigger than the FUR of Aviles/Gijon and contains the smaller independent FUR of Oviedo.
Oviedo is not large enough to be in our data set but is the regional centre of government for Asturias.
Thus the growth policies of Aviles/Gijon might actually suffer from the much larger size of the regional jurisdiction containing it. This would imply a quadratic functional form with a maximum positive impact for the policy incentive variable where the value was between 1 and 2. Table 4 gives test statistics, including tests for spatial dependence. Two significant points emerge. The first is that there are no signs of classic econometric problems -multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity or non-normality of errors. Spatial dependence is a potential problem, however. As is well known, a key issue in testing for spatial dependence is the specification of the 'proximity' of one observation to
another. There is no a priori basis for selecting distance weights. As is often the reality with applied work, insight and experimentation are complementary. Our insight grew with experiment and tests were conducted using 28 different distance weight matrices, applying all the distance measures found in the literature, including contiguity, crow-fly distance and road distance, in various formulations. Here, we report only the results for distance measures which seem most reasonably to represent underlying spatial processes and which also induced the most measured sensitivity to spatial dependence.
Test statistic values for spatial dependence were highly sensitive to how distance was measured. We could easily 'eliminate' indications of spatial dependence by just choosing a suitable measure of 'proximity'. This, in itself, should be a warning but it suggested that a useful indicator of how to test for spatial dependence most rigorously was that the proximity measure made economic sense and indicated the greatest problems, or most frequently indicated problems, of spatial dependence. Happily, measuring distance as the inverse of time-distance between FURs, using the standard road freight software, including ferry crossings, not only seems to represent 'proximity' in an economically meaningful way but also always provided the greatest measured sensitivity to spatial dependence. Table 4 reports results for two formulations -the inverse of time-distance and the inverse of time-distance squared.
From the bottom panel of Table 4 , relating to Model 2, we find only minor indications of spatial dependence. Results for our preferred measure of proximity are perfectly acceptable for two recommended test statistics, LM (error) and LM (lag), although the value of the Moran's I is suspect at 10 percent. Cheshire and Magrini (2006) between FURs is represented in the most economically meaningful way, Model 2 really embodies problems of spatial dependence.
We interpret these test results as indicating an underlying problem of omitted variables. We should not expect the growth behaviour of a FUR to be independent of its neighbours; nor should we be surprised to discover that there are systematic differences in urban growth performance resulting from location.
Our final set of variables is designed to test these explanations and further illuminate the drivers of differential urban economic growth rates. It has long been argued that location within Europe should have systematic effects on patterns of spatial growth. From at least the contribution of Clark et al. (1969) there has been a powerful argument that the process of European integration systematically favoured 'core regions' -those gaining most in terms of economic accessibility, the more centrally located. This provided the intellectual support for EU policies to reduce spatial disparities and develop stronger instruments of regional development as a complement to steps towards integration. More recently, 'New Economic Geography' has produced formal models with essentially the same conclusions (see Fujita et al., 1999 , for a survey).
An early empirical attempt to estimate the spatial economic effects of European integration was the influential work of Clark et al. (1969) . Using GDP data they estimated themselves for all regions for the years 1960-64, Clarke et al (1969) estimated regional 'economic potential' 10 for the six original members of the EEC and the then four candidate members, for three alternative states of the world: with tariffs at pre-Treaty of Rome levels; with all 10 countries having no tariffs on manufactures; and with no tariffs and two transport improvements -containerisation and roll-on roll-off ferries. Thus the change in 10 The concept of 'economic potential' is an old measure dating from the work of Harris (1954) we use the change in the values of 'economic potential' from the pre-Treaty of Rome values to those estimated as being associated with an elimination of tariffs, the EU's enlargement of the 1980s and a reduction in transport costs following the introduction of roll-on roll-off ferries and containerisation. The theoretical arguments as to why integration should favour core regions do not imply that the relationship measured for the 1980s or the 1990s should necessarily be linear but experimentation suggested the linear form reported here performed best in statistical terms.
As an additional variable to account for systematic spatial patterns in growth we include a straightforward dummy for peripherality. There has been much discussion in the literature of the impact of peripherality. The 'integration gain' variable already accounts for the systematic effects of European integration but peripheral regions may have common features (such as lower factor costs, for example).
More obviously, they have been recipients of regional aid from the EU. Although the impact of such aid has been questioned (Midelfart and Overman, 2002, or Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004) still it is unlikely to have been systematically negative. To avoid subjective judgements about what regions areor are not -peripheral, this is formulated simply in terms of time-distance from Brussels: any FUR 600 minutes or more from Brussels is classified as peripheral.
Models 3 and 4 (see Table 3 ) include these variables. It will be seen that both are significant. There is an apparent systematic integration gain effect. Perhaps more interesting is the fact that the peripherality dummy is not only significant but also positively signed. Offsetting for all other variables, including the direct effects of 'integration gain', FURs more than 600 minutes from Brussels experienced faster growth in GDP p.c. than those nearer. Neither of these variables raises any significant endogeneity concerns.
Models 3 and 4 also include three variables (plus an additional control for the initial level of unemployment 11 ) designed to reflect more localised spatial patterns of urban growth resulting from the 11 The impact of this control variable is modest and has no significant effect on the estimated value of other coefficients.
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influence of conditions in one city on the growth performance of its neighbour(s). Systematic interactions between FURs' growth rates should decline with distance between them. In regions of dense urbanisation, such as the German Ruhr, Benelux countries, the British midlands or northern Italy, one would expect the economic development of urban regions to be highly interdependent. The most obvious reason is the literature on labour market search behaviour and vacancy chains. If productivity, wages or job opportunities are relatively improving in one FUR, then economically active non-residents who can access those opportunities at the lowest cost -who live nearest -will tend to do so. Migration is expensive but changes in commuting patterns respond to only small differences in opportunities Lamont, 1982 or Morrison, 2006) . These variables are all measured as densities across the set of neighbouring FURs. In calculating the value of each density variable for any FUR i the weight attached to the value of the variable in surrounding FUR j-n is discounted by the inverse of time-distance (with the same 600 minute time-distance penalty for national borders as maximised the value of spatial dependence and an upper limit on time-distance to identify the members off the set FUR j-n ). This upper limit was determined for each density variable by experiment but the results seem reasonable in terms of economic behaviour. In all cases, the selected cut-offs worked best in an empirical sense: in the case of formulating the distance weights matrix to test for spatial dependence, they tended to produce the greatest sensitivity to tests; in formulating the density variables to represent spatial adjustment processes, they produced the best results, both in terms of significance and eliminating indications of spatial dependence.
The first is the spatial density of unemployment. If a FUR's growth rate is negatively influenced by a concentration of unemployment in it at the start of the period, then a concentration of unemployment in closely surrounding FURs should also have a negative impact. Given the possibility of job search in surrounding areas we would expect higher unemployment not to be just localised, moreover, but if neighbouring FUR labour markets are accessible, we would expect unemployment rates for workers of comparable skills to even out over the set of neighbouring FURs. Since job search areas and commuting distances of the less skilled (over-represented among the unemployed) are relatively shorter, we should also expect the influence of localised unemployment to be relatively short range and experiment showed the best results were obtained applying a two hour time-distance to identify 'neighbouring' FURs.
As with job search, the literature on the spatial pattern of innovation shows a distance decay effect, with patents tending to be applied more frequently nearer to their point of origin. So, the impact of R&D with respect to innovation is likely not to be purely localised but to be subject to a distance decay effect (Audretsch, 1998; Barrios et al, 2007) . So R&D in one urban area should have some positive differential impact on innovation and growth in neighbouring urban areas but that effect would diminish with
distance. An upper time-distance of 2.5 hours between FUR centroids to identify 'neighbouring' FURs worked best. This gives us our second spatial adjustment variable.
The third of these variables is the relative concentration of university students in neighbouring FURs at the start of the period. An initially higher stock of university students within a given FUR directly increases its growth performance (captured in our 'University Student' variable). Furthermore, this additional growth will increase relative job opportunities and tend to suck in complementary labour, including high human capital labour, from surrounding FURs. Consequently, we expect a negative impact on growth in a particular FUR of a stronger relative concentration of university students at the start of the period in neighbouring FURs; moreover, we also expect the distance over which such an effect would be measured to be longer than with unemployment. As with the spatial effects of R&D concentration, the best results were obtained if the cut off was set at 2.5 hours, to which was again added a 600-minute national border time-distance penalty.
The results of including these variables to reflect systematic spatial patterns in FUR growth and spatial adjustment mechanisms between neighbouring FURs are set out in the final two columns of Table 3, with the relevant diagnostic statistics in Table 4 . The results for our 'policy incentive' variable are significant although the squared term is still not well defined -only significant at 10 percent.
Nevertheless, an F test shows that a quadratic functional form is significantly better at the 5 percent level. All other variables are significant at 5 percent and have the expected signs.
The regression diagnostics indicate that there are none of the common econometric problems of cross sectional models. More interestingly, including the spatial variables eliminates any sign of spatial dependence. This supports our view that finding spatial dependence frequently derives from omitting variables. We have formulated variables designed to measure factors leading to systematic spatial patterns in growth performance and interaction between neighbouring FURs and they are not only statistically significant but eliminate all indications of spatial dependence. This suggests we should now not only have consistent parameter estimates but better analytical insight into the drivers of urban economic growth including how mechanisms of spatial adjustment modify growth performance in areas of denser urbanisation.
Finally Table 5 shows the impact on growth performance of a change of one standard deviation in each independent variable. Perhaps unsurprisingly the single greatest influence is the performance of the 23 economy outside the area of the major FURs. But other variables have substantial influence particularly when taken in groups of related variables such as those reflecting concentrations of R&D and highly skilled human capital or those relating to systematic spatial patterns and spatial interactions in densely urbanised areas of Europe.
Conclusions
One conclusion is, therefore, that by including variables reflecting theoretically relevant spatial adjustment mechanisms it is possible effectively to eliminate problems of spatial dependence. So, a finding of spatial dependence -at least in the context of recent patterns of European urban growthlargely reflects model specification. If theoretically appropriate variables reflecting spatial processes are included, spatial dependence is eliminated. Testing for spatial dependence is itself, however, very demanding. It was only when we realised the barrier that national borders represented for labour mobility (Cheshire and Magrini, 2006) and experimented with time penalties for national borders in the distance weights matrix, that tests revealed any problems of spatial dependence in our models of GDP p.c. growth.
Models 3 and 4 should provide consistent estimates and support the interpretation that they are a sufficiently good approximation of the underlying economic processes which generated our dependent variable, FUR growth rates in real GDP p.c., to provide insight into causal processes -so we can conclude that the evidence supports the main hypotheses summarised in the introduction:
1. Local differences in human capital and R&D activity are important factors in explaining differential rates of urban economic growth;
2. European integration has had a significant impact in accelerating growth in regions gaining most in terms of economic potential -mainly 'core' regions -but at the same time, offsetting for all other factors including these systematic impacts of integration itself, peripheral regions, on average, grew faster relative to the rest; and 3. Administrative and government arrangements for cities systematically influence their economic growth performance. Where there is a jurisdiction approximating the boundaries of an economically self-contained city-region, growth is stronger, other things equal. This is consistent with the expectations conceptualising the promotion of growth as the provision of a local public good and the resulting advantage in forming an effective 'growth promotion club' of local actors since spillover losses and transactions costs are minimised.
We stress that policies encouraging local economic growth are not conceived as being just geared to inward investment nor even, necessarily, with explicitly promoting growth at all. They may consist of efficient local public administration, avoidance of waste and a focus on activities that government at an urban level can effectively influence, such as the supply of skills or infrastructure, rather than redistribution. We cannot measure these factors comparably across the urban areas of the EU as a whole. The variable used in the present paper seems justified on theoretical grounds but is an indirect measure, reflecting not the policies themselves, but the incentive and capacity to generate such policies faced by local actors. This variable is significant even in a very simple model but more fully specified models and further testing confirms its statistical significance and suggests a quadratic functional form.
So, for growth promotion, the optimal size of government areas associated with city-regions is perhaps a little larger than the area covered by the functional economic boundaries.
The results also support the conclusion of Cheshire and Magrini (2006) that an assumption of 'full spatial equilibrium' is not appropriate in Europe with its geographically immobile population. Moreover it also implies it is inappropriate to argue there is one unified European urban system. National borders still represent significant obstacles. We only observe indications of spatial dependence if a substantial, 600-minute, time-distance penalty is added where FURs are separated by national boundaries. A comparable effect is revealed in specifying variables to reflect process of spatial interaction between geographically neighbouring cities. Conditions in cities geographically close to each other -common in densely urbanised Europe -do significantly influence economic growth patterns in each other: but not if they are separated by a national border. Borders seem, for example, to eliminate the tendency for innovations to be localised. The nature of our methodology, of course, does not allow us to discriminate so that is consistent with the barrier represented by a national border being greater in some contexts and less in others. The results, therefore, lend further support to the conclusion that in a European context of restricted labour mobility and continuing national border effects, income growth rather than population growth is a more appropriate indicator of welfare improvements in a city.
The empirical results also provide support for the theoretical work of Magrini (1998) on the significant role of human capital in regional economic growth. In models investigating urban population growth neither concentrations of highly skilled nor of R&D establishments had any influence (Cheshire and Magrini, 2006) . As drivers of economic growth we find they are highly significant. It may be stretching our results rather far but this is consistent with self selection in migration with less productive workers more influenced by climate (not significant in explaining difference in rates of economic growth) in choosing where to live and the highly skilled by wages and employment opportunities. The results also provide indirect evidence supporting the increased importance of agglomeration economies since the late 1970s and the negative impact on economic performance of increasing urban density. There was a systematic tendency for larger cities to have a faster rate of economic growth but a negative effect -25 once size and other factors were allowed for -of density. This is interesting in the debate about the sources of agglomeration economies since it implies that it is not density per se that is conduce to agglomeration economies but opportunities for productive interactions. While density rises with city size it is a negative since it reduces the propensity for productive interactions other things equal by raising congestion and the price of space.
The results do not identify strong policy levers with which to boost a city's rate of growth. It does not follow, for example, that if in the late 1970s every city had been endowed with the same proportion of university students per employee they would all have grown at the same rate as the actually best endowed with universities did. While these differences were one factor in explaining growth differences -and that helps understand what was going on -there is no necessary symmetry about the impact of giving all cities the same sized relative university sectors. It is probable that the unobserved characteristics of the cities with the highest ratios of university students were, and still are, different in important ways from cities with the lowest ratios; and were not independent of the concentration of universities in them. Nor is it possible to think in practical terms of providing all cities with equally high ratios of university students per employee and maintaining a constant quality of university students (and students who then disproportionately join the local labour force).
It is perhaps more plausible to think of the findings on the policy incentive variable as identifying a 'policy lever'. Local and regional government boundaries and functions could be restructured and, if an important element of the disadvantage FURs with fragmented local government structures face in effectively promoting growth, results from spillovers and transaction costs, the outcome should be more effective policies all round. A problem is that, of course, 'effective' local growth promotion policies at present, in circumstances in which not all city regions are equally well endowed with the incentive to develop them, may be significantly competitive and diversionary. Some local growth may be zero sum.
The success of cities endowed with beneficial systems of government may significantly be a function of the poor performance of those less favourably placed. It does not follow that all policies designed to promote local growth are zero sum, however. It is reasonable to expect that there could be net efficiency gains for the EU's urban system as a whole if city government boundaries were aligned more closely with those reflecting economically relevant patterns of behaviour and spatial economic organisation.
This also should remind us of the limitations of the Tiebout hypothesis (1956) . That is an important and influential idea but it is elaborated in a world in which local public policies have no spillovers beyond the jurisdiction in which they are implemented and people are perfectly mobile. Note: weight matrices are calculated as the inverse of time distance; the first 3 characters describe the size of the time penalty for national borders; the last digit reports the power of the inverse function. 
